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Decentralization of social services is one of the central ele-
ments of the social policy reforms being carried out in Latin
America in order to make the provision of such services more
efficient and to strengthen the democratization processes. This
article analyses the processes of decentralization of education
in seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua). It seeks to system-
atize these experiences, using a theoretical typology of reform
models; to present some results and trends in terms of the effi-
ciency and equity of the provision of these services, and to ex-
tract some useful lessons for the design of future reforms.
Although the models developed in the various countries differ
from each other, they nevertheless have some common fea-
tures: they depend on the resources provided by the central
level to finance the services, and in many cases they subordi-
nate schools to decisions taken at other levels. Among the
main economic and social effects of the reforms are the limited
progress made in participation and, hence, social efficiency;
the ambiguous results obtained in terms of technical efficiency,
and a trend which is not yet fully confirmed towards greater
inter-territorial disparities in educational indicators. Among the
lessons for policy formulation is the importance of giving the
new levels of supply some degree of real autonomy, using a
system of transfers which encourages a quest for efficiency
while at the same time safeguarding equity, taking care to pre-
serve the internal coherence of the models, giving some re-
sponsibilities directly to the schools, and ensuring that there is
a suitable framework for the regulation and supervision of de-
centralized service supply systems.







The structural reforms carried out in Latin America
during the 1980s in order to change the State’s role
in the economy, and the incorporation of the macro-
economic balances as a central element of economic
policy after the crisis of the early 1980s, led to a new
conception of public policy and especially social pol-
icy. The paternalistic conception of the State, which
had led to the measurement of policy results in quan-
titative terms, has gradually been replaced by an ap-
proach which attaches greater importance to
objectives of quality, efficiency and selectivity in
public spending. The processes of privatization and
decentralization of social services which are spread-
ing throughout Latin America are perfectly in line
with this new approach, as they aim to improve effi-
ciency in the provision of these services.
In this article, we will concentrate on the pro-
cesses of decentralization of basic education which
are taking place in seven Latin American countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Nicaragua). The analysis of these processes is
made more difficult by their complexity, for decen-
tralization promotes a new distribution of roles and
powers among the existing territorial or
non-territorial institutional actors and brings with it
profound changes in the political/institutional, finan-
cial, community participation and other areas. In or-
der to capture the main characteristics of this new
distribution of responsibilities we have brought in a
conceptual framework which also helps in compar-
ing the processes of the different countries. Our main
purpose is to describe and systematically order the
decentralization models adopted in the seven coun-
tries, using this frame of analysis. We will also try to
describe very briefly some of the effects the reforms
have had on the efficiency and equity of the provi-
sion of services –whose improvement is the main
challenge in the area of education in Latin America–
and to draw some lessons that will be useful in de-
signing future reform models.
II
The analytical framework
Analysing the logic and consequences of decentral-
ization is a complex matter, because of the wide vari-
ety of concepts that are involved in a reform of this
type. According to Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema
(1983), decentralization may be defined as the trans-
fer of responsibilities in the fields of the planning,
management, procurement and distribution of re-
sources from the central government and its organs
to field units of governmental bodies, subordinate
units or levels of the government, quasi-autonomous
public authorities or corporations with a more wide-
spread local presence, regional or functional authori-
ties, or private voluntary non-governmental organizations.
With regard to this latter category of institutions, de-
centralization may also be defined as a situation in
which public goods and services are provided by the
market in response to the express preferences of indi-
viduals; in other words, privatization may also be
seen as a form of decentralization. Within this broad
spectrum, in this article we will only consider cases
of the transfer of responsibilities from the central
government to subordinate public units and to semi-
or fully autonomous public corporations or authori-
ties.
This definition, however, still covers many pos-
sible forms of decentralization. Generally speaking,
the literature on this matter1 distinguishes three main
forms which differ mainly in terms of the degree of
autonomy in decision-making that the central gov-
ernment gives to its subnational units, but in practice
it is not easy to identify real cases with one or an-
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1 See Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1983), Klugman (1994)
and Winkler (1991).
other of these three forms of organization, since most
such cases correspond to hybrid types which com-
bine elements from at least two of the following
three forms of decentralization:
i) Deconcentration, which is the transfer of re-
sponsibilities to lower levels, with limited decision-
making power, within ministries or organs of the
central government.
ii) Delegation, which consists of the transfer of
management responsibilities in respect of certain
well-defined functions to public organizations which
may be situated outside the normal bureaucratic
structure of the central government (public enter-
prises, private enterprises regulated by the public
sector, authorities responsible for area development
and regional planning, etc.) and which generally have
semi-autonomous authority for carrying out their tasks.
iii) A form of “devolution”2 which consists of
the transfer of management responsibilities to
subnational units of the government or public units
in general, clearly viewed as separate levels over
which the central authorities exert little or no direct
control: that is to say, which have independent au-
thority to carry out their activities.
It is supposed that the decentralizing reform of
social services should improve the efficiency of pub-
lic expenditure through its impact on costs and on the
results in terms of the provision of such services.
Production costs could be reduced, for example, by
making more intensive use of local human and mate-
rial resources and promoting greater control by users
over the management of the services, thereby in-
creasing the technical (or production) efficiency of
the supply.3 Such reform should lead to more flexible
management, closer to local needs and preferences,
which should improve the yield of services and affect
both the technical4 and the social5 efficiency of their
provision. All in all, decentralization should make it
possible to progress towards more efficient resource
allocation and thus favour economic growth.
The foregoing considerations would appear to
make it advisable to choose a decentralization model
which gives the subnational levels full autonomy in
the provision of social services, in order to take
maximum advantage of the possibilities for increas-
ing technical and social efficiency. As the goods
involved are of national scope, however, there are
reasons why it might be better to give subnational
bodies only partial autonomy and why governments
often prefer intermediate (such as deconcentration or
delegation of responsibilities) and hybrid (such as
“devolution” with only limited autonomy) reforms
rather than more radical ones. These reasons are con-
nected with the fact that, in a context in which the
aims and preferences of the subnational units are
generally different from those of the central govern-
ment, or else cannot be effectively implemented at
the local level, it is useful for the central level to
keep open certain channels of intervention to further
national interests. It is easy to see, for example, that
when the different geographical areas have different
endowments of human and financial resources, de-
centralization will further increase territorial ineq-
uity. If the government is concerned for spatial
equity because it seeks geographically balanced and
integrated national development, linked with the in-
dividual distribution of wealth, it will find it neces-
sary to accompany the transfer of responsibilities
with compensatory or redistributive measures. Like-
wise, the presence of interjurisdictional externalities
in the production of public goods of this type justi-
fies measures to ensure that they meet certain mini-
mum standards. The probably limited technical
capacity of the subnational levels and the scant com-
munity participation in local decision-making can
also justify active intervention by the central levels,
at least to start with.
The central government can intervene in various
ways. Among the instruments available to it for this
purpose, transfers between the different levels of
government are undoubtedly those with the greatest
potential (box 1). Other such instruments are direct
restrictions on autonomy through, for example,
compulsory directives, laws and statutes which regu-
late certain functions such as the procurement and
use of resources and the administration of human re-
sources.
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2 The term “devolution” refers to a form of decentralization with
full transfer of power.
3 Although decentralizing provision also means losing econo-
mies of scale and possibly increasing, at least in an initial phase,
the administrative outlays needed to enable the supplier levels
to begin to make effective use of their new fields of responsibil-
ity.
4 Measured by comparing costs and results.
5 A good is socially efficient if its characteristics reflect the
preferences of the user community. Social efficiency may be a
solid argument in favour of decentralization if local preferences
and needs are effectively expressed and fit in with the combina-
tion of results desired by the community.
Indeed, the main challenge facing the central
government is to ensure that the units given new re-
sponsibilities advance as efficiently as possible to-
wards objectives consonant with the national interest,
thus maximizing the advantages expected from de-
centralization without losing control over the final
results. This challenge may be illustrated very clearly
in terms of a principal/agent model in which the cen-
tral level is the principal and the new supplier levels
the agents, who continue to be responsible to the
principal for their actions. This type of model makes
it possible to analyse the specific nature of the rela-
tionship between the centre and the periphery, bring-
ing out some of the problems of incentives that often
affect this relationship, such as adverse selection and
moral hazard.
The existence of asymmetrical access to infor-
mation when there are different central and local ob-
jectives gives rise to a problem known as adverse
selection:6 the subnational levels of government can
mislead the central government about their real pref-
erences and economic conditions, thus giving rise to
an inequitable and inefficient distribution of the cen-
tral resources. On the other hand, uncertainty about
chance events which affect the final results of each
area (macroeconomic fluctuations, for example) and
which cannot be predicted by either the central or the
subnational levels,7 nor can be observed ex post by
the central government,8 gives rise to another prob-
lem called moral hazard,9 which may lead subnational
levels of government to put little effort into the exe-
cution of their tasks, alleging “bad luck”. These two
problems make intervention by the principal more
difficult, since in order to overcome them it is neces-
sary to prepare optimal contracts10 which are costly
and difficult to apply in practice. In such a situation,
the principal may decide to use mechanisms which
will allow him to negotiate more favourable and sim-
ple contracts. The main means of reducing the mag-
nitude of these two problems is to increase the
amount of information available to the central level
through closer technical supervision, the strengthen-
ing of local sources of information, the setting of in-
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Box 1
SOME FORMS OF INTERVENTION THAT CAN BE USED BY THE CENTRAL LEVEL
 Guidelines (compulsory or not) on the quality and minimum or uniform quantity of the social
services provided.
 Stipulation, through official orders, of a binding minimum level of per capita public expenditure
on the provision of social services.
 General redistributive transfers to reduce inequalities in per capita income between districts.
 General transfers to make the terms on which local levels of authority can supply social services
more uniform. Classic examples of such subsidies are those designed to allow the same rate of
fiscal expenditure to produce the same level of services.
 General transfers conditional upon fulfillment by the recipient authority of a certain level of pro-
vision of social services.
 Specific transfers (for a specific sector of expenditure) conditional upon the fulfillment by the
recipient authority of a certain level of provision of social services.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Winkler (1994).
6 This is analysed at length in Rasmusen (1989) and Kreps
(1990).
7 If the agent could see the state of affairs before the agreement
was decided, this too would be a case of adverse selection.
8 That is to say, when there are different objectives and it is as-
sumed that the efforts of the agent to produce the result cannot
be seen by the principal. This is a very plausible situation in
view of the difficulty of following up actions carried out by ex-
ternal units in small geographical areas.
9 This is analysed at length in Kreps (1990), Rasmusen (1989),
Rees (1985 a and b), and Hart and Holmstrom (1987).
10 In which the amount of the transfers depends on the initial
conditions and preferences of the agents and on the final result
of the actions, in accordance with complex non-linear relations
which will cause the agents to reveal the truth (in the case of ad-
verse selection) and to choose the level of effort desired by the
principal (in the case of moral hazard).
termediate objectives (which are easier to follow up
than the final objectives), or greater participation by
the local community in judging the behaviour of the
subnational unit. Alternatively –for example, when
the central level lacks technical capabilities and there
is no consensus on national objectives between it and
the community– the government may perhaps prefer
to impose direct restrictions on the autonomy of the
subnational levels by transferring responsibility for
only part of the total number of functions, or for only
part of the responsibilities in respect of a given func-
tion, through more or less restrictive orders, laws or
statutes. In the final analysis, it is the combination
between the need for intervention by the central level
to safeguard national interests and the difficulties
that such intervention involves because of the differ-
ences of objectives and the asymmetrical access to
information between the agents and the principal
which explains why there are so many social service
decentralization models which take a somewhat
weak rather than a radical approach.
The degree of autonomy effectively granted to
the subnational levels in the provision of services
will vary according to the frequency and intensity of
direct restrictions, incentives for particular forms of
behaviour11 or other control mechanisms. In view of
the foregoing, the list of types of theoretical models
given at the beginning of this section is too restrictive
to take proper account of these differences. In order
to facilitate a classification according to the degree of
autonomy and incorporate more explicitly aspects re-
lating to community participation in decisions on the
provision of services and the number of recipient lev-
els involved, we will now add two new categories of
models which come somewhere between the “devo-
lution” and deconcentration models and we will also
make a change –often made in practice– in the defi-
nition of one of the existing types. The resulting clas-
sification may be somewhat arbitrary, but it will be
useful for arranging in order the various actual cases
to be discussed below. This classification introduces:
i) A category of low-intensity principal/agent
models –i.e., hybrid “devolution” models– which ba-
sically involve a form of “devolution” in which the
central level continues to finance a substantial part of
the provision of social services but the subnational
levels nevertheless have a high or very high degree
of autonomy in all the main functions involved in
such provision. Thus, there is still a relation with the
central level, although it is only slight.
ii) A category of medium-intensity principal/
agent models in which the subnational levels have a
relatively high degree of independence in almost all
the main functions but continue to be responsible to
the central level for their actions to a significant ex-
tent, because of a financing structure which is highly
dependent on that level and because they are subject
to quite strong rules and incentives laid down by it.
These models are noteworthy for the difficult balance
between autonomy and control involved in the rela-
tionship between the central and sub-central actors.
iii) A category of high-intensity principal/agent
models –i.e., deconcentration models– which involve
the  transfer  of  responsibilities  to  levels  which  are
also outside the ambit of the central level. This type
of model has many direct restrictions on the deci-
sion-making powers transferred.
Another two aspects which must be taken into
account when describing a decentralization process
are: the last level affected by the reform (the interme-
diate level,12 the local level,13 or the service-produc-
ing unit itself) and the degree of participation in
decision-making effectively attained by the local
community. For example, a reform which involves
the service-producing unit (hospital, school) and
the user community by transferring substantive deci-
sion-making responsibility to them goes deeper than
a reform which is on a level of supply that is more
distant from users and does not create the mecha-
nisms (forms of participation, use of demand subsi-
dies, etc.) needed to enable them to control the
quality of the services provided and to express their
own preferences. Another important aspect is the ex-
istence of more than one subnational level responsi-
ble for providing the service.14 When this is the case,
there may be problems of coordination and alloca-
tion of responsibilities that must be taken into ac-
count.
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11 In the shape of general or specific financial transfers allo-
cated in line with predetermined criteria or depending on the re-
cipient’s behaviour.
12 This usually means states (in federal countries), provinces or
departments.
13 This means the municipalities.
14 This refers to cases of co-responsibility between two or more
levels. It does not include marginal participation by different
levels.
In the case of the principal/agent model de-
scribed earlier, a reform in which major responsibil-
ity for the provision of services is allocated jointly to
two or more subnational levels which must operate in
a complementary manner would constitute a model
with a principal and two or more agents.15 If a reform
gives the local community a major role in decisions
on the provision of services, as for example regard-
ing different combinations of expenditures or the ap-
pointment of upper management personnel, it could
be identified with a model with one agent and two
principals (the central government and the commu-
nity). When the central level gives the subnational
levels almost complete autonomy in the provision of
services, representing a “devolution” model, this
would be a model in which the only principal would
be the community; that is to say, it would be a model
with local fiscal decisions.
III
Decentralization models in education
Most of the Latin American countries are in the pro-
cess of decentralizing their basic16 or primary educa-
tional services. Some of them are doing this for more
or less political motives (legitimation of the State,
control of conflictive situations, democratization),
others for fiscal reasons (reduction of the size and
cost of the central administration, encouragement of
indirect privatization processes), others for reasons
of efficiency, and still others for a combination of
these motives. Decentralization of educational ser-
vices, like that of primary health services, is un-
doubtedly a megatrend in the region.
The present state of the provision of educational
services in the seven countries analysed here is the
result of reforms that have generally been of an on-
going but often non-linear nature which have trans-
ferred responsibility for the provision of such
services to territorial subnational levels (intermediate
or local government levels) or non-territorial public
units (the educational establishments themselves).
Among the reforms, some are of the first generation,
begun in the 1980s or even before, while others are
second-generation reforms begun in the early 1990s.
Table 1 shows the educational decentralization epi-
sodes for each of the countries analysed. The differ-
ent initial socioeconomic and political/institutional
conditions of each country and the different motives
they have had for undertaking the reform process
have led to decentralized systems which differ in the
degree of autonomy they have given to the
subnational, territorial and institutional levels when
transferring responsibilities and in the degree of
community participation in decision-making.
The present configuration of the countries’ de-
centralized educational service systems in these three
levels –subnational, territorial and institutional– is
shown in figure 1, which takes account only of the
main models and tendencies, leaving out cases with
little national coverage.
In order to measure these dimensions effectively,
the provision of educational services has been di-
vided into four main areas covering the main func-
tions involved: i) the function of leading, regulating
and supervising the sector; ii) the financing function;
iii) the function of the direct management of the ser-
vice, which involves both current management, with
emphasis on personnel policy, and investment man-
agement, and iv) the “planning” function, which re-
fers to all the decisions on content in the educational
field, especially those referring to educational goals
and the teaching and curricular aspects of education
(fixing of the school timetables and schedules, spe-
cific goals in respect of coverage and quality, study
curricula, etc.).
Sections A to G17 of figure 1 summarize, for
each of the countries analysed, the participation of
the central level, of the subnational levels –which in-
clude the intermediate level, the local level and the
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15 Understood as different categories of agents. In a decentral-
ization process, the model applied naturally involves multiple
agents anyway, affecting the intensity of the problems of incen-
tives and of the design of the transfer contracts.
16 Here, basic education is understood as primary plus second-
ary education.
17 A summary and simplified version of the tables given in Di
Gropello (1997).
educational establishments (production units) them-
selves– and of the community (through community
or user organizations) in the responsibility for these
different functions. This summary makes it possible
not only to identify the levels receiving the functions
transferred and to see whether the processes give the
community a place in decision-making, but also, by
showing the number of levels involved in each of the
functions, to determine the degree of concentration
of responsibility for each function; it thus gives an
(albeit only partial) indication of the degree of auton-
omy of the subnational levels in the provision of ed-
ucational services. In order to make a full appraisal
of the degree of autonomy granted, this information
must be supplemented with detailed data on the role
of each of the levels in the function in question, in
order to determine their relative importance in the
decision-making process. Thus, for example, the de-
gree of autonomy of the local level in the financing
of the services depends not only on the participation
of other levels in this function but also on the relative
weight of the local level’s own resources compared
with those coming from other levels, the degree of
decentralization of the execution of expenditure18
and –a very important factor– the conditions
governing the use of the resources transferred for
budgetary execution. Likewise, as regards human re-
sources management, if the sub-function of hiring
staff is fully decentralized and only wage negotia-
tions are still centralized, the subnational level’s de-
gree of autonomy will be quite different from what it
would be if hiring itself were still partly centralized.
Table 2 provides information on the financing
structure and human resources management: the two
functions which most differ from one country to an-
other, depending on the degree of autonomy granted.
Decisions on educational content are generally
shared by the various levels, with the central level
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TABLE 1
Latin America (seven countries): Some examples
of decentralization of education
Country Starting Description
date
Argentina 1978 Transfer of responsibility for management of primary educational establishments to the
provinces.
1992 Transfer of responsibility for management of secondary educational establishments to the
provinces.
Bolivia 1994 The Popular Participation Law, adopted in 1994, and the Administrative Decentralization
Law (1995) transfer respectively the physical infrastructure of basic education to the mu-
nicipalities and responsibility for human resources management and planning to the de-
partments.
Brazil No exact date State and municipal primary education systems have formally existed since 1930. Since
1970 the municipalization of primary education has been further intensified and since the
mid-1980s the autonomy of the schools has been increased in nearly 50% of the states.
Chile 1981 Transfer to the municipalities of responsibility for the management of basic educational es-
tablishments.
Colombia 1991 With the 1991 Constitution, the main responsibility for planning and human resources
management in basic education was transferred to the departments and the municipalities
were made responsibility for the physical infrastructure of the schools.
Mexico 1992 Responsibility for the management of basic educational establishments was transferred to
the states.
Nicaragua 1993 Establishment of “autonomous centres” for primary and secondary education, with the
centres receiving broad responsibilities for the provision of services. In 1997 this process
covered 50% of secondary educational centres and 13% of the primary educational centres.
Source: Prepared by the author.
18 The local level’s own resources may represent only a small
fraction of total resources, but most of the latter may have been
transferred to the local level for it to manage.
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FIGURE 1
Latin America (seven countries): Summary of the prevailing
models and trends in the decentralization of educationa
A. Argentina B. Bolivia
C. Brazil D. Chile
E. Colombia F. Mexico
G. Nicaragua
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Carciofi, ed.
(1996), Ruiz-Mier and Giussani (1997), Draibe (1998), FUNDAP
(1996), IPEA (1994), Espínola (1995), Chile, MINEDUC (1996 a
and b), Vargas and Sarmiento (1997 a and b), Ornelas (1997),
Castillo (1998), World Bank (1996), Fiske (1996) and Hevia
(1991).
a CL = central level; IL = intermediate level; LL = local level; PU
= production unit; C = community; L, R, S = leadership, regula-
tion and supervision; F = finance; A= administration; HR = human
resources; O = other administrative functions (current and capital
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TABLE 2
Latin America (seven countries): Features of decentralized systems for
the provision of education, according to various indicators
Country Territorial distribution























– Specific transfers to departments, with allocation guidelines for current ex-
penditure.
General transfers to departments and municipalities via co-sharing of taxes,
allocated according to size of population. Since 1996, the resources for mu-
nicipalities are subject to guidelines on allocation for investment (85% of the











General transfers via co-sharing of taxes, allocated according to negotiation
and equity criteria.
Specific transfers (wages-education) allocated to the states according to the
amount collected. Since 1995, 60% of the total resources for education must
go to a fund which must spend at least 60% of them on wages. The resources
from the fund are distributed among the state and municipal schools of the
Nation according to the number of students enrolled. There is also a regula-
tion on the minimum expenditure that each municipality must make, and if
the fund does not manage to cover this amount the Union must pay the differ-
ence from its own resources. This mechanism is still only theoretical.
Autonomous labour policy
(IL and LL), subject to an
indicative average salary.






Specific transfers allocated according to the average attendance rate of stu-
dents over the last three months in each municipality and the cost of providing
the services. There are also redistributive cross- transfers between municipali-










General transfers to the departments (Situado Fiscal), with guidelines on allo-
cation to health (25%) and education (75%), allocated according to past ex-
penditure, population and fiscal effort. In practice, allocation is according to
past expenditure.
General transfers to municipalities, via co-sharing of taxes, with guidelines on
allocation (30% for education), allocated according to past expenditure, local
relative poverty indicators, fiscal effort and administrative efficiency. This for-
mula is too complex to be effective.
Decentralized hiring (IL
and, to a lesser extent, LL).
Centralized wage negotia-







Specific transfers allocated according to an established minimum level (taking
account of the amount allocated the previous year) and sectoral priori-
ties.General transfers, via co-sharing of taxes, allocated according to popula-
tion and past tax collection.
Responsibility for hiring
shared between the central
and intermediate levels.
Centralized wage negotia-







Specific transfers to schools, previously allocated according to the number of
teachers, have been allocated since 1997 according to the number of students
served, administrative expenses and average wages. Specific transfers to mu-
nicipalities, introduced only recently, are allocated according to equity criteria
(in theory rather than in practice).
Decentralized hiring (PU).
Centralized wage negotia-
tion and administrative staff
regulations, but with a
broad margin of flexibility.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Carciofi, ed. (1996); Ruiz-Mier and Giussani (1997); Draibe (1998); Vargas and Sarmiento (1997 a and b);
Ornelas (1997); Castillo (1998), and Espinoza and Marcel (1994).
a CL = central level (central or federal government); IL = intermediate level (states, provinces or departments); LL = local level (municipalities); PU = produc-
tion unit. b Primary education. c Only the distribution of the central level budget for basic education is taken into account (i.e., the subnational
levels’ own resources are not included, nor are co-sharing resources). d Total education (including higher education).
e The modest degree of decentralization is due mainly to the fact that public resources for the subsidized private sector are still centralized. There is a lack of
data on regional resources for investment.f Total education (including higher education). The modest degree of decentralization is due not only to the inclusion of higher education but also to the con-
tinued existence of a considerable degree of centralization in human resources hiring and the considerable size of a number of programmes (for example, for
the improvement of the quality of education and promotion of science and technology) which are still centralized.g Total education. Decentralized resources are provided to municipalities and schools. The figure includes own resources generated by the schools. The fact
that the degree of budgetary decentralization is still low is due to the limited coverage of the process in 1996. There is a lack of more up-to-date information.
fixing more or less flexible rules and general study
plans, complemented with rules and plans submitted
by the subnational levels. In Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia, the subnational levels have greater flexi-
bility, since there are only some basic binding rules.
If we look at the models shown in figure 1, we
see that there is a very wide variety of levels involved
in the various functions making up the provision of
services. In all cases,19 at least two levels (including
the central level) share responsibility in all functions
except capital management and the routine function-
ing of the establishments (i.e., in the management
function, excluding human resources management);
this shows that there is no simple dichotomy between
centralized and decentralized systems but rather a va-
riety of options. Indeed, the only common trend seen
in all the systems for the provision of services is the
strengthening of the regulatory role of the State
(which is very necessary in a decentralized system)
and the transfer of the direct management of the ser-
vices to subnational levels. Depending on the combi-
nation of levels per function and the indicators
shown in table 2,20 it is possible to determine the de-
gree of autonomy effectively granted to each
subnational level in each aspect of the provision of
services and to identify the level or levels receiving
most of the responsibility for services, the magnitude
of that responsibility, and its distribution among the
different levels.
Summarizing all the foregoing and also taking
into account the role of the community in the various
aspects of the provision of services,21 we can tenta-
tively classify the processes analysed into five major
types of reforms, using the classification described in
section II, which emphasizes the autonomy aspect:
i) Hybrid “devolution” processes with little par-
ticipation of the top territorial level, such as the
“provincialization” process in Argentina and the
state and municipal systems for the provision of pri-
mary education services, operating in parallel, in
Brazil. In both countries these processes provide
similar proportions of decentralized resources to the
subnational levels (around 90% of total resources, in
the case of primary education) and make most (or all,
in the case of Argentina) of the transfers in the form
of general transfers (table 2). Secondly, because of
the proportions of resources generated by the sup-
plier levels themselves, which generally represent
over 40% of the total resources available in the case
of education,22 they give more financial autonomy to
the supplier levels than in other cases, to degrees
which differ according to the guidelines for use: Ar-
gentina probably gives most freedom of decision-
making to the intermediate level, since the Argentine
provinces –unlike the Brazilian states and municipal-
ities– are not subject to any rules on how they can
use their own and co-financed resources. Thirdly, in
both countries there is almost complete autonomy as
regards personnel policy and a very high level of au-
tonomy in teaching and curricular matters. With re-
gard to participation mechanisms, in neither of the
countries have the processes been participative, or at
least the existing participation arrangements have not
functioned effectively. However, as we shall see be-
low, the school deconcentration process which is un-
der way is promoting active participation within the
schools.
ii) Hybrid participative “devolution” processes
in the production units, that is to say, processes of the
principal/agent type between an agent and two prin-
cipals (the central level and the community), with
only a slight relation between the agent and the cen-
tral level, as for example in the school decentraliza-
tion process in Nicaragua. Because of the amount of
own resources generated by the schools themselves
(an average of 45% of the total resources available to
secondary education centres in 1996) and the high
degree of autonomy they have in personnel manage-
ment (appointment of headmasters, hiring and firing,
wage incentives) and in teaching and curricular mat-
ters, the Nicaraguan process is close to a hybrid “de-
volution” process, although there are greater
limitations on autonomy than in Argentina and Brazil.
It can also be described as participative because of the
growing importance of management councils in run-
ning the autonomous educational centres.
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19 Except Argentina, with respect to the human resources man-
agement function.
20 Supplemented in the text with details of the relative weight
of own resources compared with total resources.
21 In order to evaluate this dimension we took into account not
only the existence or absence of channels of participation but
also their effective use by the community.
22 Except in the case of the Brazilian municipalities, where the
proportions of own resources must represent 15% to 20% of to-
tal resources. In the state of Santa Catarina, for example, in
1993 the municipalities financed an average of 20% of educa-
tional expenditure from their own resources, and the percentage
is rising (FUNDAP, 1996).
iii) Reforms of the principal/agent23 type, be-
tween a principal (the central level) and an agent (the
intermediate or local level), with little participation
(as in Chile and Mexico). In both cases these pro-
cesses are marked above all by a low proportion of
own resources (an average of around 10% of the total
resources available for education at the supplier
level), which limits the financial responsibility of the
service providers but leaves them free to allocate re-
sources without being subject to rules on expenditure
or allocation. Approximately 50% to 60% of the re-
sources destined for primary and secondary educa-
tion are managed in a decentralized manner and the
whole (in Chile) or most of them (in Mexico) are
provided in the form of specific transfers (table 2).
Wage negotiations, as well as the main aspects of
teachers’ career situation, are retained at the central
level, while responsibility for educational content is
shared between the central level and the intermediate
or local levels, though the central level plays an
important role in defining study plans or curricula.24
Although the Chilean model is based on
municipalization and the Mexican model is based on
control by the states, both of them lack effective
mechanisms for local participation. In Chile, how-
ever, efforts have been made since the early 1990s to
transfer responsibilities in schools throughout the
country, and this should favour participation. The
system of per capita subsidies for students as a
means of allocating resources in that country ought
to stimulate parent participation, through their choice
of the school that seems best to them, but the fact
that the subsidy is given to the municipality and not
to the school or the students’ families causes the lat-
ter to feel left out of the process of resource alloca-
tion and they continue to see education as a free
public service, thus reducing the incentive to take an
active part in choosing and running the schools.
iv) Reforms of the principal/agent type between
a principal (the central level) and two agents (the in-
termediate and local levels, functioning in
complementation to each other), with little participa-
tion, such as the decentralization processes in Bolivia
and Colombia. These reforms are marked first of all
by a co-financing system which involves two levels
in addition to the supplier level (the municipality),
with a similar proportion of decentralized resources
in both countries (approximately 90%), subject to
quite restrictive guidelines on their use (table 2).
Secondly, in both cases there is a low level of financ-
ing from local resources (approximately 5% in
Bolivia and 10% in Colombia). Thirdly, decisions on
labour policy and teaching and curricular matters are
shared between the supplier level and at least two
other similar levels (Colombia) or depend on two
similar levels which do not include the supplier level
(Bolivia). In these forms of decentralization, respon-
sibility for the provision of services is diluted among
three levels and this may give rise to problems of
responsibility, inter-level coordination and financial
supervision. Even though both countries are promot-
ing mechanisms to involve the local community
through the creation of participation bodies, and in
Colombia there is an incipient transfer of responsi-
bilities to the school level, community participation
and control continue to be weak. In Colombia,
discussions are currently under way on a change in
the formula for allocating resources by establishing a
system of per capita allocation to make the provision
of services more efficient by, inter alia, promoting
greater involvement on the part of parents.
v) Processes of deconcentration involving some
degree of participation of the production unit, as in
the case of school decentralization in Brazil. The
transfer of some categories of resources directly to
the schools, which has been done since the
mid-1980s in the state schools of many states, to-
gether with the appointment of headmasters by the
school councils and the participation of the latter in
the routine management and content of the schools,
may be considered as quite an advanced form of
deconcentration25 of responsibilities in schools, with
a satisfactory degree of participation by the school
community in the educational process, through the
councils.
Figure 2 gives a summary of the various types of
educational decentralization models.
Although these reform models may seem very
different from each other, a comparative analysis of
them reveals some general trends. Firstly, whatever
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23 Hereafter, the principal/agent model will be understood to
refer to the mid-intensity principal/agent model defined in
section II.
24 It may be noted that the way these functions are handled is
relatively more rigid in Mexico than in Chile.
25 The most highly advanced example of this process is that of
Minas Gerais, where combined measures were taken in the
early 1990s to democratize the management and strengthen the
autonomy of schools in the administrative, financial and teach-
ing areas. For a description of this process, see Guedes, Lobo
and Walker (1997).
the degree of decentralization of the budget and the
types of transfers used, the subnational levels con-
tinue to display a high degree of financial depend-
ence on the central level, since most of the resources
still come from it, except in the state systems in
Brazil. Secondly, in almost all the countries studied
there are still serious rigidities in the area of human
resources, due mainly to the rules on public officials
which still govern the wage negotiations and career
aspects and which greatly reduce the degree of au-
tonomy in the provision of services (in all the models
the teaching and curricular functions usually show
greater autonomy). Thirdly, the level of community
participation in decisions on the various functions in-
volved in the provision of educational services is low
(except in Nicaragua and to a rather lesser extent in
Brazil), although it is increasing in some cases.
Fourthly (and this is linked with the low levels of
participation), the schools are relatively absent as
major actors in the decision-making processes. In
almost all the countries, the reforms tend to transfer
responsibilities to the intermediate and/or local
levels, so that the schools are dependent on these
levels in financial, administrative and teaching
matters. Only in Brazil –and above all in Nicaragua–
have the schools come to play a central role in the
system. As noted earlier, in recent years a gradual
transfer of teaching and curricular responsibilities to
the schools has been embarked upon in Chile and
Colombia, but these measures must be accompanied
by greater administrative autonomy if they are to be
really effective.
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FIGURE 2
Latin America (seven countries): Types of
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Source: Prepared by the author.
a  IL = intermediate level (province, state or department);
LL = local level (municipalities);
PU = production unit (school);
HM = hybrid model;
IA = incipient autonomy.
IV
A brief analysis of the main trends
and results of the reforms
The possibility of evaluating a reform depends on its
time horizon, its depth, and the availability of reli-
able information for following up its results; it there-
fore varies from country to country, thus greatly
complicating the comparative analysis of results.
Furthermore, the very nature of decentralizing re-
forms, which are generally gradual, highly complex
and involve great spatial heterogeneity, makes evalu-
ation more difficult in any case. Finally, as the ma-
jority of the episodes analysed here took place in the
early 1990s, there is not yet a sufficiently broad time
horizon to make a true appraisal. Indeed, most of the
experiences are so recent that only those of Chile,
Argentina and Brazil lend themselves to an (albeit
incomplete) evaluation of their results; in the other
cases all we can do is to identify some initial trends.
The appraisal should be centered on the effect of the
reforms on the efficiency and equity of provision of
educational services. As we saw in section II, it may
be assumed that a decentralizing reform process
should have a positive effect on efficiency, but in
contrast equity may be at risk.
On the basis of the information presented in sec-
tion III and the specific data on each of the countries
analysed,26 we can draw up the following balance,
highly simplified for the sake of comparability:
i) The scant progress made in terms of participa-
tion in most of the countries has not permitted real
advantage to be taken of the potential of the reforms
for helping to raise social efficiency.27 All the coun-
tries have more or less specific channels of participa-
tion, but few of these have been effective. The factor
which has had most influence on the degree of effi-
ciency attained has been the initial motives behind
the reforms. Thus, Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent
Brazil and Bolivia, have registered most progress in
participation, and this is connected with the impor-
tance attached to democratization objectives in those
countries. Another factor has been the degree of fi-
nancial autonomy of the new supplier levels and the
degree of autonomy of the production units (as the
cases of Brazil and Nicaragua show).
ii) Little information is available on the evolu-
tion of the technical efficiency of provision of educa-
tional services, as measured through cost-impact
indicators,28 either because most of the reforms ana-
lysed are so recent or on account of lack of informa-
tion. Only in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile
is there some long-term information on the evolution
of indicators of this type (summarized in table 3).
Generally speaking, this evolution has been of an
ambiguous nature in all the cases where main re-
sponsibility for the provision of services has been
transferred to subnational (intermediate or local)
levels of government. In the three countries in ques-
tion, for example, coverage and expenditure have fol-
lowed equally marked upward or downward paths
and there is not enough information on the evolution
of cost-quality indicators. At all events, it does not
appear that the reforms have been accompanied by
tangible improvements in the productivity of expen-
diture. In contrast, there would appear to be a posi-
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26 Taken from Carciofi (ed.) (1996), Ruiz-Mier and Giussani
(1997), Draibe (1998), Vargas and Sarmiento (1997 a and b),
Ornelas (1997), Castillo (1998) and Di Gropello (1997).
27 The absence of direct information in this respect, due to the
lack of periodic surveys on user satisfaction, limits the possibili-
ties of evaluation - whatever the time horizon - to the analysis of
indicators of community participation in decisions on the provi-
sion of services. It may be assumed that a satisfactory degree of
participation is a necessary prior condition for achieving a satis-
factory degree of social efficiency.
28 In order to make direct measurements of technical efficiency,
cost-impact indicators are used in which the impact is estimated
by the effect on coverage (measured, for example, by the rate of
school enrollment), quality (measured by the rate of repetition
or the level of scholastic achievement) and cost (measured by
indicators of expenditure or inputs). The difficulty of comparing
numerators and denominators expressed in different units of
measurement and establishing a causal relation with the reform
under analysis suggests that these kinds of indicators should be
interpreted with caution.
tive evolution in cases where the decentralization has
been to the schools themselves, as in the Brazilian
state of Minas Gerais and –although this is a more
recent experience and hence more difficult to evalu-
ate– in Nicaragua.29 In the absence of cost-impact in-
dicators, or in order to supplement them, positive and
negative signs in terms of efficiency can be identi-
fied by using data on possible changes in the alloca-
tion and use of resources, the existence or absence of
prior training conditions, the institutional develop-
ment and regulation needed to ensure the success of
the reforms, the degree of autonomy granted to the
subnational levels, and the existing mechanisms for
encouraging efficiency. Generally speaking, some
positive trends are to be observed, such as some in-
creases in investment (Bolivia, Colombia), but there
are also some problems in the use and allocation of
resources: for example, there have been cases of
faulty utilization of the infrastructure (Bolivia) or ex-
cessive expenditure on personnel (Nicaragua, Chile),
due to shortcomings in the design and application of
the models.
iii) Likewise, with regard to territorial equity
there is little information on the evolution of the ter-
ritorial distribution of educational results and its rela-
tion with the reforms. The available analyses
generally concentrate on the distribution of resources
and expenditure among geographical areas resulting
from the reforms, taking it as an intermediate indica-
tor of equity.30 In the only two cases where compara-
ble data are available for two periods sufficiently
distant from one another –in Argentina and Brazil–
there are indications that the dispersion of service
quality between different areas has probably in-
creased. In both countries this is related with inequi-
table distribution of resources among areas, in the
context of the hybrid “devolution” models applied,
which has increased the dispersion of intermediate
indicators of the quality of education (wages, teach-
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29 According to a recent survey (World Bank, 1996), the various
actors involved agree that the academic level of secondary edu-
cation has improved in the centres which have been made au-
tonomous. However, it would be necessary to quantify this
result and compare it with the size of the resources generated by
co-payment in order to draw conclusions on the productivity of
the expenditure involved.
30 It may be assumed that a progressive distribution of expendi-
ture should make it possible to improve the results.
FIGURE 3
Argentina: Relation between GDP and expenditure
per student in primary education, 1995
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Porto and
Sanguinetti (1996) and Bisang and Cetrángolo (1997).
FIGURE 4
Brazil: Relation between GDP and expenditure
per student on education in the municipal
sector, 1990
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Paes de Barros,
Pinto de Mendonça and Shope (1993).
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TABLE 3
Latin America (three countries): Results of some of
the reforms in terms of efficiency and equity
Country Technical efficiency Equity
Argentina Between 1980 and 1991, the net rate of school enrollment
rose by 6.6%, while the percentage of the population between
5 and 9 years of age who had never gone to school went down
by 70%. However, expenditure on primary education went up
by 85% between the sub-periods 1970/1977 and 1978/1985.
Consequently, the evolution of the cost-coverage indicators
for the provision of educational services is not clear. Further-
more, there is a lack of periodic measurements of the quality
of the education provided, so that it is not known how the
cost-quality indicators evolved.
After the transfer, dispersion of the average wage levels of
primary school teachers trebled, favouring teachers in the
provinces with higher levels of income:
σ
s
(1983) = 13a; σ
s
(1992) = 39 and r
s.GDP (1992) = 0.6
b
This evolution, combined with the adjustments made in the
size of the teaching staff by each province (in order to secure
greater uniformity in terms of the number of students per
teacher) would appear to have given rise to a regressive dis-
tribution of expenditure per student in primary education
(eps) (figure 3):
r
eps, 1/GDP (1995) = -0.3
and may have led to increased dispersion of quality of educa-
tionc between different areas.
Brazil Between 1982 and 1995 the net rate of primary school enroll-
ment rose by 23%. However, the real per capita expenditure
on primary education also rose by 23% between the
subperiods 1980/82 and 1983/90, so that the evolution of effi-
ciency in the provision of educational services is not clear.
Furthermore, there are no direct quality measurements that
would enable us to determine the evolution of the cost-quality
indicators.
In some states, the cost-coverage and cost-quality indicators
may have improved. Thus, for example, in the state of Minas
Gerais, after the 1991 reform which increased the autonomy
of the schools, there have been improvements in the academic
performance tests (increases of 20 points in Portuguese and
40 points in mathematics between 1992 and 1994), in the con-
dition of the infrastructure and in teachers’ training, for the
same amount of expenditure.
There has been an increase in the dispersion of quality of ed-
ucation between different areas, as may be seen from the in-
crease in the dispersion of the proportion of teachers with
incomplete primary education (tip) between different areas:
σtip (1980) = 39; σtip (1994) = 63
which is connected with the ongoing increase in the disper-
sion of the average wages of teachers after the liberalization
of the labour market.
The evolution of the dispersion of wage levels, combined
with the adjustments in the number of teachers made by each
municipality, gives rise to a regressive distribution of expen-
diture on education per student in the municipal sector
(resps) (figure 4):
r
reps, 1/GDP (1990) = -0.6
Chile With the 26% drop in per capita expenditure on basic educa-
tion between 1981 and 1990, enrollment in the municipal sec-
tor (m) went down by 23% over the same period, while
enrollment in the subsidized private sectord (p) went up by
73%.
Furthermore:
Rp - Rm (1992) = 6 pointsf
This shows the low management capacity of the public
schools compared with the subsidized private ones, in spite of
the municipalization process.
In spite of the positive correlation between municipal contri-
butions and the fiscal capacity of the municipalities,e the
effects of decentralization on territorial equity have been
limited, and in fact there is inequality of expenditure per
student on education (eps) (calculated as the sum of the
municipal contributions and the school subsidy from the
central government) only with respect to a small number of
high-income communes. If we add the compensatory expen-
diture programmes implemented as from the early 1990s, we
even observe a slightly progressive distribution of expendi-
ture with respect to the poverty distribution, by municipali-
ties (p):
r
eps.p (1994) = 0.4
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Carciofi, ed. (1996); Porto and Sanguinetti (1996); Draibe (1998); Guedes, Lobo and
Walker (1997); Paes de Barros, Pinto de Mendonça and Shope (1993), and Winkler and Rounds (1993).
a
σ is the standard deviation, calculated on the basis of indices, for comparability between countries. b r is the coefficient of correlation
(r
x,y = Cov(x,y)/σx σy).
c Insofar as higher average wages attract more highly trained persons and have a positive impact on teachers’
attendance and motivation, a positive relation may be expected between wage levels and the quality of education.
d The reforms of the early 1980s in Chile also encouraged privatization, by giving the same public subsidies to both private and public
schools.  The existence of subsidized private schools is a very useful  benchmark for measuring the  efficiency of municipal schools.
e In 1993, as regards spending on education per student, the richest decile contributed four times more to education than the poorest decile
(Winkler, 1994). f Rm = educational result of the municipal sector; Rp = educational result of the subsidized private sector. The
positive difference in performance in favour of the subsidized private schools is maintained even after taking into account the socioeco-
nomic bias.
ers’ training). In the other countries, information is
only available on the territorial distribution of re-
sources or expenditure after the reform, without
any comparisons over time, serving only to detect
the degree of progressiveness or regressiveness of
the distribution. In three of the seven countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Mexico) there would appear
to be a regressive correlation between expenditure
and levels of income or poverty (figures 3, 4 and 6).
In another two countries (Colombia and Nicaragua)
there is a lack of correlation between the transfers
between different levels of government and the
levels of development of each area (figures 5 and 7),
which should likewise lead to a regressive territorial
distribution of expenditure, because of the com-
bination of this lack of correlation with the regres-
sive distribution of subnational resources. Only in
Chile is there a slightly progressive distribution
of expenditure (table 3), related with the allocation
and compensation mechanisms used in that country.
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FIGURE 5
Colombia: Relation between poverty and per capita
share of current national income, 1996
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Vargas and
Sarmiento (1997a).
FIGURE 6
Mexico: Relation between poverty and federal
expenditure per student on basic
education, 1995-1996
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Mexico, Secretaría
de Educación Pública (1996) and World Bank (1992).
FIGURE 7
Nicaragua: Relation between poverty and
per capita transfers by the central government
for education, 1996
Source: Prepared by the author.
V
Some lessons for the
design of reform models
What may be concluded from this rapid assessment?
It is not easy to draw conclusions, but the appraisal
we have made indicates that the longer-term results
of the reforms in terms of efficiency and equity have
not generally been very satisfactory, since they show
little progress in the social efficiency of social ser-
vice provision and the productivity of expenditure,
while the quality indicators tend to differ widely.
Furthermore, the most recent tendencies are ambiguous.
However, it is clear that these somewhat unsatisfactory
results are due mainly to problems of design or imple-
mentation of the reforms which can be solved.
We will now try to outline some lessons31 on the
design of reform models that may be drawn from the
foregoing analysis:
i) The new supplier levels must be given a de-
gree of real autonomy, minimizing the number of di-
rect restrictions. The scant progress made by Chile in
the field of efficiency, for example, is due largely to
the rigidity of the model applied. The lack of labour
flexibility, which is a common fault in many coun-
tries, is also a hindrance to the achievement of higher
levels of efficiency.
ii) A factor of fundamental importance for the
results obtained is the internal coherence of the
models, especially as regards the clarity of definition
of the responsibilities assigned to each level and
the existence of effective coordination mechanisms.
This is even more important in models based on the
co-responsibility of two or more levels. In these
cases there can easily be inefficiency in the use of re-
sources (as for example in Brazil, where decisions
affecting the investment/current expenditure ratio
are not coordinated, giving rise to problems of over-
investment compared with the availability of staff.
iii) A crucial point for the success of the reforms
is the design and implementation of financial trans-
fers between different levels of government. As al-
ready noted in the context of decentralization reform,
the continued existence of a significant amount of
central-level finance which is distributed among the
subnational levels according to socioeconomic crite-
ria is a guarantee of equity, which may potentially be
at risk with the reforms. Furthermore, when there are
low levels of participation and training, transfers
from the central level can significantly help to en-
courage options which are efficient from the techni-
cal, fiscal and social point of view. In view of the
special features of the agents (the new supplier lev-
els) and the principal (the central level), the latter
should guarantee all the subnational levels a certain
minimum level of financing, proportional to the ini-
tial socioeconomic conditions and local production
costs (adjustment for equity), and supplement it with
additional finance subject to efficiency criteria (allo-
cation according to the results obtained in terms of
coverage or quality of the services). In order to mini-
mize the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard which may arise in situations of unequal ac-
cess to information and differences of objectives be-
tween the agents and the principal, however, the
central level must establish an efficient system of su-
pervision which will make it possible to check on the
efforts really made by the agents to reach the produc-
tion targets, paying out the allocations according to
the efficiency attained, and which will also stimulate
the collection and transmission to the higher levels of
information on the socioeconomic situation of the ar-
eas served by the new supplier levels, in order to fa-
cilitate allocation by equity. If this is not done, the
interventions of the central level –assumed to be the
remedy for the problems observed– could turn out to
be as harmful as the problems themselves, or even
more so.
When we review the nature of the transfers and
their allocation criteria used in the first-generation
reforms, we are struck by the fact that, firstly (except
in Chile), specific transfers are only quite small, al-
though they are more suitable than general transfers
for meeting sectoral needs and are also necessary for
linking resources with efficiency indicators. Sec-
ondly, there is a marked absence of allocation criteria
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31 These must of course be interpreted in the light of the initial
socioeconomic and politico-administrative conditions of each
country.
and/or guidelines which take account of equity and
technical efficiency.32 This partly explains the gener-
ally rather unsatisfactory results observed in these
countries in terms of efficiency and equity. With re-
gard to the second-generation reforms, almost all of
them try to incorporate these criteria explicitly
through more or less complex formulas and guide-
lines on expenditure or allocation. There are cases,
however (Colombia, Nicaragua), where the weak-
nesses of the regulatory framework and lack of infor-
mation make it difficult to apply the equity criteria,
thus contributing to the lack of correlation between
transfers and levels of poverty. In order for an incen-
tive system to work properly it is important also to
have flexible labour markets and real autonomy, so
that the levels receiving the services can respond ef-
fectively to the stimuli given.
The transfer of the main areas of authority to
an intermediate level or to groups of municipalities
(depending on the size and population density of the
geographical divisions of the country), together
with decentralization of administrative, academic and
financial functions to the schools themselves, should
make it possible to maximize efficiency and preserve
equity. The approaches at the level of individual munic-
ipalities applied in many countries, in particular, give rise
to losses of economies of scale that decentralization to a
higher level should be able to avoid. The gains in terms
of technical and social efficiency can be maximized by
giving the producer units significant degrees of auton-
omy, as indicated by the positive experiences in Brazil
and the preliminary results in Nicaragua.
It is of fundamental importance to have a regula-
tory framework adapted to the regulatory and super-
visory requirements of a decentralized system for the
provision of educational services. Such a framework
should involve the central level as well as the inter-
mediate and local levels.
Increasing social participation and control is an-
other great challenge of the reform process. The mo-
tivation for the promotion of democracy and the
granting of greater autonomy to the producer units
should have positive effects in this respect.
The reforms should be accompanied by specific
training measures and programmes, especially in as-
pects relating to management. The lack of technical
and administrative skills has adversely affected the
results in Brazil and is a particularly serious problem
for Bolivia and Nicaragua.
Furthermore, in view of the amounts of informa-
tion needed for the functioning of the system, local
bases of up-to-date information, with effective chan-
nels for its transmission, are an essential requirement.
In conclusion, the most recent reforms have had
some favourable effects, such as the efforts to reduce
the arbitrary allocation of transfers, to create more
effective channels for participation, and to adopt ap-
proaches less focussed on the municipal level. Some
of these elements have been incorporated ex post
facto in reforms that were initiated at an earlier date.
However, there are still some problems whose solu-
tion is a major challenge for the third-generation re-
forms: the limited real autonomy granted in respect
of certain functions, especially human resources
management; the as yet scanty development of the
regulatory frameworks needed for the proper applica-
tion of allocation formulas and the supervision of
service provision systems; the adoption of service
provision models which are hard to coordinate and
regulate; the lack of autonomy of the units producing
services; the lack of up-to-date information systems,
and the insufficient efforts made to provide training
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